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1.  Introduction
International financial liberalization and financial integration have not worked out as advertised.
In the recent past, emerging markets have been rattled by financial turmoil. The degree of
financial volatility and the frequency of panics, crises, and contagion have made the current state
of affairs socially costly and politically disappointing in emerging economies. Political support
for liberalizing policies in emerging countries is now harder to achieve.  The prospect of long-
run faster growth has not compensated for these new headaches.  All this is especially true in
Latin America, which after a decade of solid structural reforms fell prey to international financial
turmoil at the time it most needed external finance and unexpectedly suffered a deep recession in
1998-99.
Industrial countries by contrast, and especially the G-7, face a different problem.  They
view with concern the increasing volume of official financial rescue packages that have been
dished out in recent years, starting with Mexico 1995, for a total of almost $200 billion.  Fearing
that the current strategy to deal with financial turmoil in emerging economies may involve a self-
fulfilling explosion of their quasi-fiscal liabilities, both bilateral and to the International
Financial Institutions, the industrial countries have reacted with an agenda to scale back the
magnitude of official support and force private lenders to share the burden.  In turn, the private
sector claims that the burden-sharing push can easily lead to the arbitrary disregard of contracts
and demands clear and fair rules of the game to engage in development financing in the future.
There is consensus that the international financial architecture needs reform, but there is
little clarity and agreement as to how to fix it, or even what to fix.
What’s wrong with world financial markets?  Diagnoses abound. An overview suggests
that views can be classified into three groups.  First, some see the main problem as one of
excessive capital flows to emerging markets, beyond what these economies can productively use.
Second, others see the main problem as just the opposite: world financial markets fail because
they fall short of delivering enough financing for productive projects.  And finally, a third group
sees the volatility and unpredictability of terms and availability of development financing as the
main drawback of current financial markets.
There is no shortage of  “solutions.”  Several reports have been, are being, and will be
produced by multilateral organizations, think tanks, academics, and task forces.  But the
connection between proposed solutions and the problems that need to be resolved is not clear.  If4
the new architectural design does not address the key structural problems and lay new
foundations, it will be no more than interior decoration.
All views on problems are complementary and own a portion of the truth. Initiatives to
reform the international financial architecture will likely impact differently on the various
distortions in international financial markets.  From a policy point of view, it is key to pose the
issue of reforming the international financial architecture as a second-best proposition, one in
which reforms will have to endure the existence of unavoidable distortions. In the context of
multiple distortions, the reduction of one of the distortions is not necessarily welfare improving.
For example, the objective of eliminating excessive and volatile capital flows could be achieved
by impeding the international financial integration of emerging markets, in an extreme case by
closing these markets altogether, but at a potentially enormous cost in terms of economic growth.
The question is what are the main problems to guide the trade-offs in this multifaceted issue?
Problems and solutions involve three main players: emerging countries, industrial
countries (the official sector), and foreign investors with interests in emerging economies (the
private sector).  Unfortunately, the costs and benefits of addressing the problems of international
financial architecture are very unevenly distributed among the players. This unequal distribution
may underlie the wide range of diagnoses and initiatives, and help explain the alignments in the
debate around the redesign of the international financial architecture. The need for positive net
benefits for all players to ensure their voluntary participation in any change of the status quo
severely restricts the set of feasible reform proposals and may leave out the most efficient new
arrangements.  In fact, our own set of proposals (see Fernández-Arias and Hausmann, 2000a),
which we derive from efficiency principles, are likely to be more costly to industrial countries
than the proposals encouraging official disengagement that are the core of the new doctrine
currently being advanced by the official sector.
This article discusses this “political economy” side of redesigning the international
financial architecture.  It draws heavily from our previous work (Fernández-Arias and Hausmann
2000a, 2000b). The next section reviews the problems of international financial markets.  We
subsequently assess their importance in light of the evidence and discuss for whom they are
crucial.  The last section reviews the solutions that are being proposed and discusses the
distribution of their costs and benefits.  Concluding remarks follow.5
2. Problems of International Financial Markets
The problems in international financial markets faced by emerging markets can be grouped
under the headings of “Too Much,” “Too Little,” and “Too Volatile,” depending upon which
characteristic of capital flows to emerging markets is emphasized.
Theories of Too Much
Theories of Too Much usually assume that moral hazard encourages excessive lending.
1
Resources are also misallocated because they are apportioned to risky projects without
internalizing the costs involved.
2  Somebody is providing an implicit guarantee so that the parties
to the transaction are not internalizing all the risks.  Too much lending and too much risk-taking
occur. Eventually, the guarantee is called and a crisis emerges.  The various scenarios differ in
the source of the implicit guarantee.
The most traditional scenario involves government guarantees of the banking system.
The same logic will apply to a corporation perceived as being “too big to fail,” but banks remain
the prime example because they play a critical role in the payments system.  Governments cannot
afford to let banks simply go broke because that would trigger a catastrophic sequence of
defaults in which otherwise solvent, efficient firms go bust when their clients are unable to make
payments from deposits frozen in problematic banking institutions.  Counting on the protection
provided by an inevitable government bailout, bankers may assume too much risk.
A variation of the theory of moral hazard views pegged exchange rates as an implicit
guarantee (Mishkin 1996, Obstfeld 1998, Buiter and Sibert 1999).  This form of moral hazard
would reduce incentives for hedging exposure to exchange rate risk and would favor short-term
foreign debt, which falls due in the period in which the guarantee would be more credible.
Another Theory of Too Much follows similar lines but blames the International Monetary
Fund, bilateral creditors, and multilateral development banks for providing rescue packages that
shield either foreign investors or governments from the fallout of excessive risk-taking.  This
kind of moral hazard is thought to lead to excessive lending by foreign investors who expect to
be repaid from resources provided through future rescue packages if real returns on investment
                                               
1 Excessive lending to the public sector may also be caused by political economy distortions, which may have
contributed to the debt crisis of the 1980s.  Here we focus on lending to the private sector, and therefore assume that
returns pass the market test.
2 Dooley (1997), Krugman (1998), and Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) provide formal models of this intuition.6
do not materialize.  Even if it is true that official rescue packages are quickly repaid, as is the
experience so far, and do not provide a subsidy directly responsible for creating moral hazard,
they would still make it possible for the government to extend a moral hazard-inducing bailout
(an enabler of moral hazard, in the terms of DeLong, 1999). This theory has received much
currency, especially among economists (see Sachs, 1998a), and Eichenbaum et al., 1999).
Theories of Too Little
For all the impressive growth in capital flows to emerging markets, they are surprisingly low
relative to what one would expect given the dominant trade theories and the way open economies
are usually modeled.  In fact, current capital flows are low compared to those observed prior to
World War I and, more recently, to those in some particularly telling countries.  In this section,
we will review explanations of this anomaly based on commitment problems at the international
level.
It is useful to start by focussing on problems of willingness to pay when the enforcement
of financial contacts is limited.  Loans are not self-enforcing contracts. After receiving a loan,
only coercion or the promise of future loans makes debtors want to fulfill their obligations.   In
order to compensate for the risk, higher charges are made.  But higher interest rates further
increase repayment problems by eroding the borrower’s ability and willingness to repay in full
and by worsening risk through adverse selection in the pool of borrowers and moral hazard in the
choice of projects (see Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984).
In order to address willingness-to-pay problems, loans are often secured by collateral, and
courts adjudicate problems that arise during the life of the contract.  When nonpayment occurs or
is possible, bankruptcy procedures are set in motion.  These allow ability-to-pay problems to be
separated from willingness-to-pay problems.  They also provide a mechanism to secure the
cooperation of the different creditors, to remove management if creditors find it necessary, and to
transfer the ownership of assets to creditors.
3  The absence of an adequate bankruptcy law and
court system can have deleterious effects on the financial system.  It makes coercion less
credible, worsening the willingness-to-pay problem.  It also increases the cost of crises because it
precludes concerted action to provide additional financing needed for the company’s survival.
                                               
3 La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1998) provide an empirical analysis of creditor and shareholder rights for a large
set of countries and establish their importance as determinants of the level of development of financial systems.7
In cross-border finance, the willingness-to-pay problem is severely aggravated by the
involvement of a sovereign government.  Since sovereigns do not need to abide by the rulings of
any foreign court, the problem may be serious and difficult to resolve.  Sovereign risk may
explain why cross-border lending is so small.  In the standard model (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989)
sovereigns will pay so long as it is not in their interest not to do so, given the “punishment” they
may receive for nonpayment.  However, the incentive not to pay goes up with the volume of debt
owed.  This theory, originally developed for public debt, can be extended to apply to private
sector borrowing under the “protection” of the sovereign, which may suspend convertibility,
nationalize assets, or otherwise interfere in the payment process if such action is perceived as
increasing national welfare (Fernández-Arias and Lombardo, 1998a).
As a result, sovereign risk augments overall risk beyond the traditional commercial risk,
and therefore, in the absence of financial enhancements, represents a floor for private risk.
Sovereign risk will cause markets to impose a credit ceiling on countries so as to keep the
volume of aggregate debt below the level that would create incentives for nonrepayment.  The
lighter the “punishment” the world can impose on the country, the lower the credit ceiling will
be.  Economies that are more integrated into the world are more easily “punished” and hence
should get a higher credit ceiling.
Another aspect of sovereign risk concerns the so-called “original sin” affecting almost all
emerging market currencies (Hausmann et al., 1999, and Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999):
they cannot be used to borrow abroad and cannot be used even domestically to borrow long term.
Original sin may be caused in part by sovereign risk. If a capital importing country could borrow
in its own currency it would be able to improve its net worth by letting the currency depreciate.
This fundamental incompleteness of the financial market has important implications for
financial fragility: It causes investments to be financed either in dollars or short term. If the
funding is done in dollars, many projects, and the country as a whole, will have a currency
mismatch, as cash flows would be denominated in a different currency from that of the debt. If
companies try to avoid this problem by borrowing in pesos, they will have a maturity mismatch
as only short-term loans are available in the domestic market. Hence, maturity and currency
mismatches are endemic in countries with original sin.
Notice that sovereign risk is a commitment problem.  If the sovereign could somehow tie
its hands and mandate future payments with no tricks, irrespective of future conditions (including8
a change in ruling faction), the problem would disappear.  Lending would be more ample and
stable.  Yet even when the sovereign might well be better off making such a commitment, the
binding technology to make the pledge credible once indebtedness is high may be difficult to
find.
As a result, thus far, private markets have tried to insulate themselves from sovereign risk
with relatively rigid contracts lacking clauses that could be exploited to justify nonpayment in
legalistic ways.  Yet a scheme like this tailored to a pure willingness-to-pay problem may make
crises triggered by a reduction in ability-to-pay more difficult to manage and more costly.  It
usually makes debt workouts quite messy.
Theories of Too Volatile
Recent financial turmoil and unpredicted crises, frequently described as market panics, herd
behavior and financial contagion, have reinforced the idea that this is a new phenomenon in
international financial markets. In what follows we discuss liquidity crises and financial
contagion, the two main factors underlying recent market volatility and unpredictability.
The traditional example of liquidity crises is a bank run.  Banks typically have a term
mismatch: They receive short-term deposits, even sight deposits, and lend them at longer
maturities.  Assume all borrowers are doing just fine.  If there is no attack, the bank will do just
great.  But if suddenly depositors all want their money at the same time, the bank will go bust.
In fact, in the bank’s attempts to collect loans too quickly, even solvent borrowers may get into
trouble due to the credit crunch.  Hence, expectations may be self-fulfilling: both optimism and
pessimism can be justified ex post.
More generally, capital account imbalances, especially in the presence of high levels of
debt, raise the specter of bank-run-like payments crises if market financing dries up, whether or
not an actual banking crisis develops.  This market reaction may be based on a loss of confidence
in a particular country or simply reflect global financial contagion. In fact, a temporary
disruption in financial flows, due for example to a prolonged bout of contagion, may cause
enough real damage to generate a full-blown crisis.  Thus, countries may be subject to situations
in which the roll-over of public debt is subject to multiple equilibria where, in the bad outcome,
creditors will refuse to refinance debts, provoking a grave short-term liquidity problem.  The
ensuing credit crunch can cause a serious contraction, high real interest rates, and payments9
problems in the corporate sector, thereby deteriorating the health of the financial system and
justifying the attack.
Furthermore, the pressure on the exchange rate caused by the capital account shock may
lead to depreciation, further contributing to the deterioration of the economic segments with net
foreign currency exposure.  In fact, currency devaluation alone may generate multiple
equilibrium and a liquidity-like crisis (see, for example, Chang and Velasco, 1998 and Krugman,
1999).  This occurs even in economies in good fiscal health, irrespective of the exchange rate
regime and whether or not the currency was previously overvalued.
Aside from full-blown liquidity crises in specific instances, recent widespread financial
turmoil has meant enormous volatility in terms and volumes of financing, and unreliable access
to external financing, for most emerging markets.  The explanation is the so-called “financial
contagion.”  The main inter-country linkages underlying the high degree of correlation among
international financial prices in emerging markets do not appear related to world market
conditions, trade relations among them, or other traditional transmission mechanisms. Instead,
the linkage is that they share a common set of investment institutions making joint investment
decisions (Fernández-Arias and Rigobón, 1998).  The most notable example is the collapse of
bond prices in Latin America following the Russian default of August 1998; Russia is a country
with whom the region has very few economic ties of any kind.
One important explanation to account for the evidence is that investment institutions were
hit by big losses in crisis countries, e.g., Russia, and became capital deficient to back their
obligations (fulfill margin calls) and not creditworthy themselves, which forced them to shrink
their portfolio and reduce risk bearing.  The result was the kind of portfolio reallocation observed
in practice.  Because of the illiquidity of this market, perhaps because non-specialized buyers are
less informed than specialized sellers (see  Calvo, 1998), this reallocation requires fire-sale
prices.  The strong contagion in our region would be due to the fact that most of our investors are
within a narrow field of institutions specializing in non-investment grade paper. In this sense,
financial regulations in industrial countries prohibit very large institutional investors from
holding non-investment grade assets and may therefore have caused the inefficient segmenting of
the market and drastically reduced its liquidity.
A key implication is that bond spreads under contagion do not reflect country risk.  Prices
are misaligned but arbitrage opportunities are not exploited because the specialized, informed10
investors are capital constrained.  Over time, the pricing gap would be arbitraged as the
constraints over our specialized investors ease and new financial intermediaries are established.
Therefore, lack of liquidity resulting from contagion would be temporary, a prediction that also
bodes well with the evidence.  To a large extent, financial contagion is akin to a liquidity crisis in
slow motion, whose ultimate outcome depends on whether the speed of recovery is enough to
pull out the economy.  It is clear that the possibility of financial contagion makes financial
integration unreliable.
3. Assessing the Problems
Different types of problems affect different players in different ways.  For example, problems
associated with theories of too much hurt both emerging countries, which end up in crisis, and
industrial countries, which may be required to come to the rescue.  Industrial countries may have
to provide financial help either bilaterally or through multilateral organizations such as the IMF.
Other problems of international financial markets, however, have a lower potential for generating
full-blown crises that may directly hurt industrial countries.  Problems associated with theories of
too little are for the most part suffered exclusively by emerging countries, which cannot enjoy
the wealth they could appropriate if they had access to more financing.  Similarly, the problems
associated with the excessive volatility of flows, unless in extreme cases ending up in crisis, are
also suffered mainly by emerging countries.
The assessment of the problems in international financial markets, i.e., the analysis of
their relative relevance, is therefore important to draw an accurate map of how the status quo is
differentially appreciated by emerging and industrial countries and the possibly contradictory
implications that changes to the status quo may have.  In principle, these asymmetries should not
produce any disagreement about the objective assessment of the problems, only on policy
preferences.  In practice, however, it is more “correct” to couch different subjective perspectives
as different assessments of objective reality.  That is also an honest psychological tendency.  In
that case, discrepancies in the diagnosis of what is wrong in international financial markets can
be interpreted as a reflection of discrepancies in interest.  We now turn to the analysis of these
discrepancies.11
Confronting the Historical Evidence
It is well known that capital flows to developing countries are smaller than desirable under any
reasonable standard.  Taking into account the existing differences in capital/labor ratios,
international flows across nations are way too small relative to flows within nations (Bayoumi
and Rose 1993,  Bayoumi, 1997), which underlies the strong correlation between domestic
savings and investment first uncovered by Feldstein and Horioka (1980).  This evidence implies
that Theories of Too Much do not address some of the most important distortions present in the
world. Hence, policy recommendations predicated on them, without reference to their impact on
other important distortions, cannot be presumed to improve efficiency.  At the same time, this
evidence supports the Theories of Too Little and, indirectly, the Theories of Too Volatile.
The magnitude of capital flows under the Gold Standard, before World War I, clearly
shows that international flows can be much larger than today.  As De Long (1999) points out, the
historical record of large flows in the Gold Standard period can also be interpreted as direct
evidence against the moral hazard view.  First, in that period there was no IMF or functional
equivalent to create international moral hazard in developing countries, and yet flows were
larger.  And second, financial crises then were even more frequent and deep; the IMF is certainly
not a requisite for crises!
Theories of Too Much imply that capital flows would be skewed in favor of the type of
flows most likely to be covered by guarantees, as Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) point out.
Borrowing by banks and government borrowings would appear at the top of the list.  Also, the
moral hazard involved in currency risk would justify these flows’ being skewed toward the short
term. But the evidence from international banks that report to the BIS is that their cross-border
lending to developing countries shows no evidence of these distortions relative to developed
countries. Moreover, portfolio flows rather than international commercial banks have been the
key players in this decade. The massive losses stock and bondholders have been subject to and
the enormous political costs paid by governments in crisis countries make it hard to imagine that
moral hazard alone could create such widespread financial havoc.
Therefore, there is strong evidence that moral hazard is not the dominant distortion in
international finance to developing countries. The same holds true in the context of impediments
to economic development.  Even if moral hazard is a piece of the explanation of the East Asian
crises, the fact that these countries have the most successful sustained growth record in known12
history is countervailing evidence that should make us pause.  Radical institutional reform of a
financial system recently regarded as a development model in the name of moral hazard appears
premature given the current state of knowledge (see  Feldstein, 1998).  Concerning Latin
America, our region has made very significant progress in improving banking supervision and
regulation, especially since the Tequila crisis in 1995.  However, financial turmoil has been at a
peak and access to world capital markets has been closed for long stretches.
What Went Wrong in Recent Experiences?
To unearth the causes of financial turmoil, it is important to review the salient features of recent
crises.  Starting with the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, financial turmoil in emerging countries has
surprised analysts.  A graphic way to view this is presented in Calvo and  Fernández-Arias
(1998).  There, the six crisis countries of 1997-98 (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Russia, and Thailand) are compared with the six largest countries in our region (Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela).  If we classify these countries into low and
high risk according to market risk spreads and ratings in mid-1997, right before the crises, we
find that, except for Russia, crises occurred in the low-risk countries.
We believe that lack of predictability is largely rooted in problems of multiple equilibria
rather than in a misunderstanding of the workings of economies.  This means that the existence
of a potentially “bad” equilibrium may trigger a self-fulfilling financial panic, in which the
collapse validates the state of panic that causes it.  These problems resemble bank runs and are
associated with liquidity problems. In some of the recent crises, fundamentals were consistent
with the required capacity to service the debt load, but a sudden lack of liquidity severely
damaged the economy, leading to an unexpected change in sentiment.  The unnecessary nature of
the run that provoked the liquidity crunch can account for the failure of the market to anticipate
the crisis.
And most surprising of all, and this is very important, the strong financial contagion
associated with these crises infected countries enjoying strong fundamentals that had essentially
no economic linkages with crisis countries.  This was most notable in Latin America during the
Russian crisis.  Most emerging markets in the world have lost much of their access to external
financing, even though their economies do not present any great inherent weaknesses.  Recent13
experience with financial contagion points to the importance of addressing distortions in the
international financial system that lie beyond policy reform in emerging countries.
Finally, we shall also keep in mind the severe limitations of policy instruments in
stopping a crisis once it has started, which puts a premium on prevention strategies.   Once a
crisis breaks out, the experience shows that it quickly develops into a meltdown with enormous
output losses, even if rescue packages are quickly dished out (see Calvo and Fernández-Arias,
1998).
What Is Wrong?
The previous analysis suggests that serious distortions are present in international financial
markets. They are behind the fact that flows are on average small, relative to the difference in
capital-labor ratios and demographic trends in the world. They are also behind their unusually
high volatility and co-movement of capital flows. However, the dominant view in industrial
countries, as expressed in the Report of the Council on Foreign Relations and the G-7 Cologne
communiqué, among other documents, is centered on concerns of moral hazard, the ones that
may cost some industrial country taxpayers money. While much of the policy debate has
assumed that the dominant distortion is moral hazard, the preponderance of the evidence
suggests that other distortions are more binding.
4. Solution Proposals: Winners and Losers
In this section we attempt to identify the winners and losers of various proposals for the redesign
of the international financial architecture.  To do that requires us to: a) establish which are the
problems of international financial markets that the proposals will solve or aggravate; and b)
assess the corresponding implications for each player according to its specific perspective.  If all
perspectives were compatible, all parties would be either winners or losers and ranking proposals
would be a purely technical, objective matter.  If not, as we suspect, the evaluation of proposals
depends on the perspective, and there may be winners and losers preventing consensus.  In that
case, agreement from losers would require a compensation mechanism, which may be difficult to
find.
It is probably not feasible to change the status quo in a way that entirely satisfies all
parties involved, because in that case solutions to the problems of the international financial14
architecture, which have been debated for some time now, would have been agreed upon already.
Lack of consensus on some key issues probably arises because it is not feasible to make progress
uniformly on all fronts of the problem.  Rather, as in any interesting issue in economics,
proposed solutions involve trading off different problems in international financial markets
which, as analyzed in the previous section, may produce winners and losers among blocks of
countries.  Emerging and industrial countries have sharply different perspectives on this matter.
Concerning private creditors, how are problems in international financial markets
experienced by the private sector? To a first approximation, the private sector is not affected by
problems in international financial markets because the market risk premium would incorporate
whatever risks there are of not recovering investments.  Ex-post private gains may be positive or
negative, and the private sector naturally has a vested interest in actions that maximize recovery
after a crisis event.  But unless the private sector is systematically misled, which is an
assumption difficult to justify either theoretically or empirically, problems should have no ex-
ante or long-run consequences for private net returns. This argument also holds for “positive”
risks such as public guarantees inducing moral hazard, whose beneficial impact on private
returns would also be offset by the corresponding reduction of the competitive risk premium.
It is helpful to think of emerging countries as residual claimants, directly benefiting or
suffering from the consequences that international financial markets have on their real
economies.  Under this interpretation, emerging countries with productive investment
opportunities benefit from having access to foreign finance and suffer from access restrictions,
and their attendant inefficiencies of  underinvestment or crises. These inefficiencies directly
accrue to emerging countries.
4  From the perspective of emerging countries, the evaluation of
changes to the status quo needs to balance their impact on the level of financial integration and
investment outside crisis episodes with their impact on the crisis scenario, i.e., the trade-off
between the two sources of inefficiency.
In principle, the perspective of industrial countries could be expected to coincide with
that reflecting the direct interest of emerging countries for reasons of altruism, and perhaps self-
interest.  However, the likelihood of transfers from industrial countries in the form of crisis aid,
especially if specific programs are designed to this effect, would tilt the balance in favor of15
reducing the risk and depth of crisis.  In other words, industrial countries can be expected to
accept a lower level of productive financial integration as the price to pay for any given crisis
tolerance.  This gap in perspectives holds irrespective of whether industrial country crisis aid
causes moral hazard or not.  Even if all parties shared the view that moral hazard is highly
relevant, the extent to which it is adequate to control moral hazard would be subject to the
perspective gap.  In the remainder of the section we will explore the implications of this gap for
the subjective assessment of proposals to redesign the international financial architecture.
So far we have neglected the perspective of the private sector. As explained above, with
competitive risk premiums, private investment and repayment can be viewed as a zero-sum game
in expected terms, and therefore, as a first approximation, neglected when considering its impact
on private returns and the country’s welfare.
5  In practice, private sector agents may be subject to
agency distortions, large sunk costs in emerging countries, or other distortions that make them
prefer proposed solutions leading to bigger and more stable markets.  It may appear likely that
these “second order” effects tend to align the private sector with emerging countries more than
with industrial countries.  In this piece we choose not to explore this ramification and neglect the
private sector perspective.
Current Proposals under Consideration
We are concerned with the possibility that current proposals under consideration may have a
negative developmental impact, because nearly all of them entail less capital flows to support
development in emerging markets. This outcome comes as a result of fighting moral hazard or as
an expedient to reduce financial instability. In what follows we show that this is the case in both
initiatives under review and those under actual experimentation.
In our view, the single most important problem with the way the debate on reforming
international financial architecture is being conducted is its partial, even unilateral, approach to
the problems to be solved.  We must remember that reducing any identified distortion (such as
moral hazard) is not necessarily good policy and that successfully alleviating a specific
                                                                                                                                                      
4 In the absence of good investment opportunities, access to foreign finance would be irrelevant, or even
counterproductive if, due to distortions, it leads to overinvestment.  This inefficiency would also accrue to emerging
countries as residual claimants.
5 Nevertheless, it may be relevant for sectoral welfare, that is the internal distribution within the country.  For
example, a public guarantee in favor of the private sector in an emerging country leads to a gain of the domestic
private sector offset by a loss of the domestic official sector, which may alter the sectoral distribution.16
undesirable symptom (such as financial volatility) is not necessarily the manifestation of a
welfare improvement.  In the context of multiple distortions, policies need to be evaluated in a
second-best framework, taking into account their interaction with remaining distortions. For
example, the objective of reducing the moral hazard induced by implicit official guarantees to
international private capital flows would be served by curtailing official financial support to
countries in distress.  However, such financial support would be extremely beneficial in the event
of a liquidity crisis and financial contagion.  The overemphasis on moral hazard would lead to
counterproductive policies if the latter distortions are preponderant.  Similarly, reducing the
incidence of crises by impeding capital flows may be a counterproductive policy once the
deleterious growth effects of lower capital integration are factored in.
There is a good chance that most of our reservations regarding the initiatives currently
being advanced in international fora owe to our Latin American perspective. Our assessment is
based on the efficiency losses that will occur if external capital does not flow to high-return
investment opportunities in Latin America.  It is clear, however, that an efficient architecture
entails financial support from developed countries when things go wrong, which will happen
from time to time.  From the alternative perspective of developed country taxpayers, it may make
sense to prefer reforms that limit financial risks even at the cost of efficiency.  The current bias
in favor of reforms that limit capital flows may be better interpreted in this way rather than on
efficiency grounds.
In what follows we concentrate on a number of core initiatives under active consideration
that characterize the main angles of the debate.  We omit other initiatives, not because they are
without use or importance but because they are either uncontroversial or propose changes that
are more decorative than foundational, i.e., they take too many walls and windows for granted.
For example, we do not discuss standards on transparency because we see them as
uncontroversial but also of limited impact.
We group the initiatives examined in this paper into three sets and review them in turn.
The first two sets of initiatives involve the provision of financial support triggered after an
emergency arises.  First, we consider initiatives concerning the unilateral provision of financial
support by the official sector.  Second, we consider initiatives in which the private sector is also
given a role in providing financial support. Finally, the third set of initiatives refers to reforms to
the financial institutional framework in which international capital flows to emerging markets17
take place.  They encompass standards and regulations applicable to financial systems, both
national and international, as well as monetary and currency arrangements in emerging markets.
Official Financial Support
The main idea behind initiatives concerning official financial support relates to its function of
lending of last resort at the international level. The basic argument for international versions of a
lender of last resort is the same argument used in a domestic context: by promising in advance to
provide financial support in case of unexpected need in which fundamentals are right or will be
right, (liquidity) crises are prevented.  In fact, financial panic rationalized by the damage in
fundamentals that a massive financial withdrawal (a “run”) would generate cannot exist when
there is a commitment of ample support that would avoid such damage.  (Alternatively, in the
case of insolvency, a lender of last resort could also intervene to facilitate the debt workout of
reorganized entities at minimum cost.)
However, current official initiatives attempt to scale back the level of official intervention
relative to the volumes involved in rescue packages in recent years.  Not only are volumes
expected to be much lower, but also, in the new doctrine, the conditions under which such
support would be forthcoming will be more discretional and less transparent, making use of the
so-called “case-by-case approach” and “constructive ambiguity.”  Furthermore, the extent of
official support would be linked to the comparable treatment of private creditors, further limiting
the scope of official support.  The reason given for this official retrenchment is that large,
unconditional, and unilateral support finances the bailout of private creditors, which promotes
substantial moral hazard leading to overborrowing and crisis.  As we will see, whether this is a
good reason for retrenchment depends on the prevalence of liquidity or solvency crises.
In the case of liquidity crises, lending of last resort prevents crises at no cost, and is
therefore beneficial all around.  Successful lending of last resort reduces private default risk, but
this is not a source of moral hazard.  This is a legitimate reduction in risk obtained from
removing an inefficient risk factor, i.e., the panic equilibrium. This does not open a gap between
social and private risks.  In fact, lower expected risks will give rise to more capital flows that will
be applied efficiently.  Liquidity crises call for large, unconditional, and unilateral official
financial support.18
The drawbacks of generous official financial support are associated with insolvency
cases.  In these cases unilateral official support is costly and relatively ineffective in terms of
helping the real economy, because official financial support “leaks” to private creditors.  It is
precisely the anticipation of this “leakage” that leads to moral hazard.
In our view, the balance of crisis cases justify a rather automatic lending of last resort
facility for eligible countries.  First, our diagnosis indicates that in this era liquidity crises are
prevalent and, therefore, the risk of wrong application of the lending facility and moral hazard
would be correspondingly small.  Therefore expected benefits would prevail.  Second, there are
ways to discriminate liquidity and solvency crises in order to reduce the risk of wrong
application.  The better the fundamentals before the crisis, the more likely it is that the crisis is of
liquidity.  Eligibility preconditions to qualify for membership to the facility based on sound
economic fundamentals would play the role of screening out cases of insolvency.  (In fact, the
incentive to attain the required standards would induce “moral safety,” the opposite of moral
hazard.)
An important case in which the above principles are fully applicable is international
financial contagion. This case is similar to the case of liquidity crises in key dimensions.  First,
recent experience shows that, like liquidity crises, international financial contagion appears to be
prevalent in this new era of international finance, and is in fact another distortion underlying the
Theories of Too Volatile.  Second, from the point of view of the country the basic problem is not
weak fundamentals but lack of financing, i.e., distorted risk spreads and lack of access to market.
And third, it can be treated with a purely financial solution: the provision of financing is efficient
and prevents the crisis.  In the case of contagion it works not because it removes the panic
equilibrium but because it relaxes a temporary constraint distorting the normal equilibrium.
The above parallels justify a facility similar to lending of last resort but geared towards
supporting countries victim of international financial contagion to counteract the cumulative
effect of the credit crunch and prevent a full-blown crisis.
6  Once again, the risk is to finance a
country with weak fundamentals that will fall into crisis even after contagion ceases.  However,
the scope for accurately discriminating which countries should be supported is large.  First, the
widespread nature of contagion makes it quite apparent when countries are victims of this
                                               
6 This kind of initiative has been put in practice under the misleading name of emergency financing, e.g., the 1998
$40 billion plus Brazil package.19
phenomenon; non-systemic effects should not be attributed to contagion.  Second, even distorted
by contagion, relative market indicators across countries, e.g., spreads, continue to reflect
relative fundamentals and are reliable pieces of information (see Fernández-Arias and Rigobón,
1998).  An official contagion facility should stand ready to support countries meeting the
eligibility conditions.
Our diagnosis of the relative lack of importance of moral hazard in causing recent crises,
which is probably the majority view in the profession, can of course be challenged on technical
grounds.  The scope for implementing a set of eligibility preconditions to weed out most
insolvency cases from benefiting from the facility is also debatable.  However, there is a good
likelihood that the official retrenchment being proposed is not mainly driven by technical
discrepancies on these issues but by the asymmetric implications that such a facility has for crisis
countries and industrial countries.  Despite all of the efficiency gains that, in our view, such a
facility would attain, clearly it will sometimes be a costly failure.  The problem is that the gains
obtained in most cases accrue to crisis countries, but the losses, when there is failure, are paid by
taxpayers in industrial countries. This asymmetry can explain the announced official
retrenchment. The same asymmetry can explain the timidity of the attempts to implement official
mechanisms to prevent future crises, despite the fact that one of the main lessons from recent
experiences of crisis resolution is that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
The Contingent Credit Line (CCL) facility approved by the IMF is the main innovation in
the provision of official support.  In this facility, countries pursuing sound policy that also meet a
number of financial and reporting standards would enjoy financial support in the form of a credit
line that can be drawn on if they fall victim to panic or contagion.  CCL can be seen as a variant
or substitute for a lender of last resort for countries in which good collateral (which is difficult
for a sovereign to produce) is replaced by the requirement of a healthy economy.  Unfortunately,
a hesitant, and perhaps reluctant, approach to the problem has rendered ineffective this well-
inspired idea (see Fernández-Arias, Gavin, and Hausmann, 1998, for an early CCL proposal).  At
the time of writing, the CCL facility currently includes too many obstacles to make it attractive
to benefiting countries.
One key problem with the IMF version of the CCL facility is that from the point of view
of a country, the committed support may be too small and is not certain and its delivery may take
time, any of which may render the mechanism ineffective against panic.  The reason is that, as it20
stands, delivery is mostly not automatic at the country’s choice but requires final approval
depending on the Fund’s assessment of the situation.  It is important to set country eligibility
criteria on the basis of preconditions and allow automatic withdrawal.  Uncertainty about
effective protection defeats prevention and makes this facility somewhat similar to the traditional
rescue package strategy.  Once again, additional assurances about the financial safety of official
support conspire against effectiveness in preventing crises.
Another problem with the CCL facility is that no individual country wants to be the first
to apply and somehow signal the need for special protection.  It is important to implement this
facility in a way that eligible countries are regarded as the strongest and most prudent of the
pack, rather than those seeking potential help for some dubious reason unknown to the market.
Whether expectations are positive or negative depends to a large extent on the rules of the
eligibility game.   For example, if countries need to apply individually and run the risk of not
being accepted expeditiously, interest will tend to be low.  If, on the contrary, the IMF produced
a list of eligible countries and allowed them to join in block (e.g., automatically extending the
facility privilege as a matter of course), chances are that belonging to the club will be regarded as
a prize.
The analysis would not be complete if we do not consider the case of solvency crises.
Contrary to a liquidity crisis, in this case the solution does not involve only the provision of
finance.  In this case, reforms to strengthen fundamentals, including conditionality, are essential.
In the absence of these changes, additional financial support would not re-establish confidence
and would postpone needed reforms deepening the inevitable crisis, diluting the market
discipline that would otherwise be exerted when fundamentals turn riskier. So it is clear that a
lender of last resort is not the best answer and a different approach to official support ought to be
applied.
7  Furthermore, it is important to consider the involvement of the private sector in order
to arrive at an efficient plan of financial support, because otherwise official support may end up
being a bailout of private creditors with little benefit to the country.
                                               
7  Still, many of the lessons derived from recent experiences with liquidity crises are applicable.  In particular, it
would be desirable for a new generation of financial support programs to be put in place and be activated before
crises erupt.  Contrary to liquidity problems, presumably, fundamental solvency problems can be detected in
advance and are amenable to early action.  Otherwise there should be a strong presumption that liquidity is the key
issue.21
Private Sector Involvement
The new doctrine on private sector involvement (PSI) appears to feature non-voluntary, “forced”
involvement.  Forced participation is needed in extreme cases in which domestic adjustment and
official international support are deemed insufficient to reestablish confidence. In that case, if
confidence is not reestablished then the official money will be quite unproductive, since the
private sector would exploit the opportunity to bail out of the country. But it is important to keep
in mind that forced PSI is likely to be very costly in terms of future access to private capital
unless it follows clearly agreed-upon rules of the game set beforehand.  Therefore, forced PSI in
general, and official discretion in particular, ought to be minimized.
It is important to notice that the number of cases that would qualify for PSI is not
independent of the supply of official funding.  Forced PSI may be required if official support is
small, but such a situation ought to be avoided if sufficient official support can do the trick of re-
establishing confidence.  Unnecessarily forcing PSI to reduce official exposure, especially if it is
discretionary and opportunistic, is likely to be counterproductive from a development viewpoint.
Another implication of the previous principles is that PSI should not be used as a way to teach a
lesson to the private sector with the purpose of reducing moral hazard, because such a strategy is
likely to have very large social costs. In general, the traditional approach of domestic adjustment
and official support with the private sector coming back on its own is superior and should not be
limited by a stingier approach to official international involvement.
As explained above, the gap in the perspectives of industrial and emerging countries
leads to excessive official preoccupation for moral hazard and excessive caution in putting
official funds at risk.  In this context, both biases imply excessive reliance on forced PSI.  Our
concern is that this approach to the coordination of official and private involvement may lead to
eroding private capital markets for development.
In deep crisis, the country is unable to sustain its current debt level and, hence, additional
official money per se is unlikely to reestablish confidence. Here, debt reduction may need to
form part of the solution. Mechanisms to address these cases are now under experimentation.
These include  renegotiation with private bondholders as a prior condition for Paris Club
rescheduling (e.g., “comparable treatment” requirement in Pakistan) or IMF support (e.g., default
of Brady bonds in Ecuador).  However, the experience in Ecuador clearly signals the dangers of
a new doctrine of official retrenchment and forced PSI.22
First, the official international sector should not lose sight of its fundamental coordinating
role during crises. To request private sector involvement as a prior action before the official
sector commits itself puts the cart before the horse. It demands the private sector to participate in
a still non-existing program, thus reducing the informational content of the situation. Secondly,
the delay involved in waiting for a private sector response may involve a dramatic deterioration
of domestic economic conditions as economic activity collapses, aggravating fiscal and financial
imbalances and further undermining confidence. Finally, the whole notion of comparative
treatment may be the wrong paradigm. After all, during the last “orderly workout” that Latin
America went through, i.e., the Brady plan, the roles of public and private sector were quite
different, with the former putting in additional resources to generate the enhancements that
allowed for debt reduction of the latter.
If forced burden sharing becomes part of the “implicit contract,” it will have a negative
effect on the cost of capital and market stability.  A case-by-case, secretive approach with weak
coordination makes the worst of this approach to PSI.  Furthermore, if forced PSI is used for
anything other than extreme cases, it runs the risk of becoming a major destabilizing factor. In
fact, up to now, if an economy got into trouble, the willingness of the government to call for an
IMF agreement was seen as a way to signal its disposition to adjust and thus was a means to
reestablish confidence. Under forced PSI, the private sector would interpret such an
announcement as a reason to try to get out of the country before a stay or a debt reduction is
forced upon them, making governments less willing to call on the IMF for assistance in a timely
fashion.
By contrast, we favor the alternative in which official support is ample and PSI is
demanded only when necessary, and then in a way in which the burden is shared according to
clear rules not subject to abuse.  This mechanism would define a standard of “excusable default”
that would ensure flexibility when needed. An international bankruptcy court, for example,
would fit this characterization.  In that case, under insolvency conditions PSI would kick in
according to international law, coordinated and supplemented by official support.
8  The
efficiency of this workout mechanism is likely to lead to lower, rather than higher, ex-ante
financial costs and be highly beneficial from an emerging country perspective.  At the same time,
                                               
8 At the same time, the country ought to adjust and reform.  Ideally, the balance between private and official support
would depend on how prudent the country’s policies are.23
it will likely be more costly in terms of official financial risk exposure, and therefore less
attractive from an industrial country financial perspective.
An international bankruptcy court could be modeled after the corresponding domestic
institution.  This court would authorize domestic borrowers not to repay when the country is
deemed unable, rather than simply unwilling, to pay. This determination would stop legal action
against borrowers, thus creating a real difference with respect to an equivalent unilateral
sovereign action.  By transferring the power to authorize nonpayment to an independent court
that does not have a willingness-to-pay problem, this arrangement provides more flexibility
while keeping sovereign risk under control. Obviously the sovereign could still decide to violate
the decisions of the international court, but in doing so it would forego the protection against suit
provided by the court. More importantly, it would allow those willing but possibly unable to
repay to pre-commit to a more credible arrangement. Since an independent body will have
declared the default to be “excusable” on the merits rather than a unilateral decision by a
sovereign, trustworthiness in future dealings would be enhanced.
Finally, there is also scope for voluntary PSI leading to substantial efficiency gains if the
official sector is willing to take more risks.  For example,  PSI in an official international
financial contagion facility would also be quite useful in arriving at the kind of sums needed to
effectively support countries.  It is clear that financial enhancements are needed for the private
sector to be willing to lend to countries during the period of contagion.  The idea is therefore to
provide official enhancements sufficient to spark private interest to resume lending in such a way
that leverage is maximized.  For example, official enhancements may take the form of partial
guarantees of private credits, in such a way that the risk mix becomes acceptable for private
lending.
It is worth noting that the use of official enhancements to spark private lending is a way
of relaxing the sovereign risk constraint that private creditors face.  In fact, official multilateral
lenders face a much lower sovereign risk and may be able to leverage their lending by
transferring that lower risk to private parties.  The reason for their risk advantage is that their
policy requires them to suspend operations in countries that run into arrears.  Since they are a
cheap source of future credit and are committed to stopping lending in case of arrears, sovereigns
repay, giving these multilateral institutions their preferred creditor status.  In a world where such
binding devices are scarce, questions have been raised about whether these institutions are24
making adequate use of their commitment technology.  In the context of countries lacking access
to private financial markets, there is no question that the official sector can be very effective in
alleviating this distortion.  But once again, efficiency gains come at the cost of additional official
exposure to financial losses.
Financial Standards and Regulations
Recent crises have uncovered widespread weaknesses in financial systems and have prompted
the elaboration of financial standards and regulations to strengthen them.  Interestingly, the
emphasis on the kind of fixing that needs to be done directly depends on which class of
distortions is deemed more substantial.  Those who think that moral hazard is the main problem
emphasize the strengthening of the solvency of financial institutions to make sure that they do
not play with other people’s money.  The main initiative in this field has to do with capital
adequacy requirements for banks in the domestic system and strong supervision to ensure that
they are enforced.  Basle risk weights for bank lending are also being reformed along the same
lines, ensuring that lending to higher risk countries faces a higher regulatory cost.
This agenda has moved forward very quickly in Latin America, especially after the
Tequila crisis, and is behind the resilience of the banking systems in the region in withstanding
the consequences of the recent financial turmoil and the deep 1998-99 recession. In fact, most
Latin American countries have capital adequacy requirements that are above the Basle standards
and supervisory systems have been thoroughly reformed. While this has made banks stronger, it
has not translated into more stable flows of international capital. Hence, while these policies are
quite uncontroversial in the region, it is unclear that they do much to limit international financial
turmoil.
Other initiatives are designed to limit financial volatility.  One class of initiatives is
aimed at strengthening the liquidity of the banking system by setting high liquidity requirements.
More generally, there is an emphasis on large international reserves, especially in relation to
short-term obligations.  To the extent that liquidity concerns are prevalent in recent experience,
policies aimed at delivering high reserves and discouraging short-term debt make sense.  At the
same time, these policies have the drawback of imposing a higher cost of capital and reducing
the domestic absorption of foreign savings.25
Latin America is already doing much of what is being recommended. It is interesting to
note that the most prudent Latin American governments have found it useful to have a liquidity
policy while the OECD has explicitly eliminated liquidity requirements from its regulatory
scheme.  At present, international reserve levels relative to M2 are about 10 times larger in Latin
America than in the typical industrial country. This radical difference must also reflect the
presence of a fundamental difference in economic structure. Holding reserves makes sense if
there are states of the world in which a country cannot access the international capital markets.
For example, by being sufficiently liquid a country can avoid falling into the kind of self-
fulfilling liquidity crisis that is associated with rolling over the foreign debt. This is the
consequence of distortions other than moral hazard and is unlikely to be addressed by any of the
initiatives to curb moral hazard that are on the table.
It is important to recognize that these kinds of prudential policies are second best.  They
achieve higher stability by impeding capital flows, rather than by solving or compensating the
fundamental problems.  The concern is that they are costly in terms of development.  In this
sense, the mechanisms of international last resort lending or a contagion facility can be viewed as
another, superior way of addressing issues of liquidity since they involve actual insurance, rather
than self-insurance.  The problem, of course, is that these more efficient solutions pose a
financial risk to industrial countries.
Finally, there is the important issue of how to reform financial regulations in developed
countries in order to prevent problems that may affect emerging markets.  A case in point is
international financial contagion, whose main transmission mechanism, if not root cause, resides
in how financial intermediation to emerging markets operates. Two interrelated problems have
been identified in recent experience: first, the likelihood that financial intermediaries become
over-leveraged as a result of market losses and are forced to sell off their positions; and second,
the dependency of emerging markets on a select group of specialist financial institutions, which
makes the market for paper quite illiquid.  These problems lead to fire-sale prices in times of
trouble and the collapse of the market.
The main initiative on the table to address these concerns is the tightening of regulation
to discourage high leverage, which would therefore make over-leverage less likely.  We are
concerned that, as in the case of other initiatives on the table, this one seeks financial stability by
simply reducing capital flows to emerging markets, thus aggravating one of the important26
distortions to be fixed.  This initiative may be beneficial from an industrial country perspective in
relation to its own financial stability, but may be quite costly for development.  In fact, from an
emerging country perspective, it would be preferable to focus reforms in other directions that
offer high efficiency gains at some minimal cost to industrial country taxpayers.
For example, regulatory forbearance in financial centers to be activated in the case of a
systemic shock would help to diffuse the sudden jolt that over-leverage causes. In this sense,
marking to market makes illiquid markets even more unstable when the asset price collapse is
not based on fundamentals.  Regulatory flexibility under these contingencies in order to impede
the cascading collapse would be an effective circuit breaker under “peak” times, preferable to
reducing the flow levels on a permanent basis.  Potentially more promising would be a small
relaxation of the regulations that prohibit important institutional investors from buying non-
investment grade paper. This may  represent a radical change in the structure of emerging
markets, which have become overly dependent on a small group of specialized investors.  This
would permit higher flows and reduce the collapse during contagion episodes.  Unfortunately,
this efficiency gain comes with an additional risk of the regulated institutions.  However small
this cost may be, this is again an industrial country cost necessary to produce the emerging
country benefit.
5.      Concluding Remarks
Most current initiatives for reforming the international financial architecture are guided by two
principles: a) constrain official financial support in order to avoid bailing out the private sector
and create “moral hazard;” and b) increase stability in financial markets by limiting capital flows
to emerging markets.  We find these principles unsatisfactory as a basis for a solution to the
problems of international finance for development and propose alternative ones.  Even more, we
fear that current initiatives may be developmentally counterproductive once their negative effects
on the level of capital flows and growth are factored in.
Ours is a Latin American assessment of the initiatives, and therefore not a neutral
viewpoint.  In order to clarify the debate it is important to recognize that reforms to the
international financial architecture have asymmetric effects for the parties involved.  In
particular, reforms that support deeper financial integration and faster growth in the region may
also be more costly to industrial countries in terms of financial risks when disruptions occur.27
The above principles minimize the financial costs of international cooperation, which may reflect
the fact that the efficient integration of emerging markets may be too costly for industrial
countries to embrace.
We have argued in favor of new institutions to address liquidity and contagion problems.
We have expressed support for the creating the function of an international bankruptcy court. We
find value in improving financial regulation and supervision but think that the greater additional
payoff in Latin America is related to the improvement of institutions that solve commitment
problems and manage liquidity risks.
We also find that many of the origins of liquidity crises and problems of financial
fragility are caused by original sin, i.e., by the fact that the national currency cannot be used to
borrow abroad or even domestically to borrow long term. This creates the mismatches that can
easily come home to roost at the first sign of trouble. It also limits the ability of central banks to
backstop the market unless they hold enormous amounts of international reserves. This calls into
question the monetary architecture of the world.
Debate about the new financial architecture is spurred by dissatisfaction with the world as
we find it.  Financial turmoil is exacting enormous social costs in all emerging market countries.
Contagion has made the problem more difficult and costly to address through the exercise of
national virtue.  It has transformed localized infections into an international disease that needs an
international cure.
How much of current social suffering is attributable to an inadequate financial
architecture is an open question.  But it is clear that the costs of this inadequacy are borne mostly
by emerging countries, while any decisions on how to change international institutions and their
financial backing inevitably involve the industrial countries.  One is reminded of Ortega y
Gasset’s remark that the pain of others is so much easier to bear than one’s own.28
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